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This section of the Journalprovides notes on recent cases, pending or
newly-enacted legislation, and other current legal materials. The Updates
section is designed to aid the practitioner in relating the Journalarticles to
the daily practice of labor and employment law. The Journal welcomes
outside submissions of brief judicial and legislative summaries.
Supreme Court holds that a 'prima facie case and sufficient evidence
of pretext may permit trier offact to find unlawful discrimination,without
additional, independent evidence of discrimination, though such showing
will not always be adequate to sustainjury'sfinding of liability" under the
ADEA. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097

(2000).
Petitioner Reeves, 57, was a supervisor in one of respondent's
departments. His responsibilities included supervising employees and their
hours of work. In 1995, Powe Chesnut, the company's director of
manufacturing, was informed that the department's production was down
because employees were often absent, late, or leaving early. Because the
monthly attendance reports did not indicate a problem, Chesnut ordered an
audit, which, according to his testimony, revealed numerous timekeeping
errors and misrepresentations by Reeves, among others. Chesnut and other
company officials recommended to the company president, Sandra
Sanderson, that the responsible employees, including Reeves, be fired, to
which she complied.
Reeves filed this suit, claiming termination because of his age in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).
At trial, respondent contended Reeves had been fired due to his failure to
maintain accurate attendance records. Reeves attempted to demonstrate
that this explanation was pretext for age discrimination, introducing
evidence that he had accurately recorded the attendance and hours of the
employees he supervised, and that Chesnut had demonstrated age-based
animus in his dealings with him. The case went to the jury, which returned
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a verdict for Reeves. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Although recognizing that
Reeves may well have offered sufficient evidence for the jury to have
found that respondent's explanation was pretextual, the court explained that
this did not mean that Reeves had presented sufficient evidence to show
that he had been fired because of his age. In finding the evidence
insufficient, the court weighed the additional evidence of discrimination
introduced by Reeves against other circumstances surrounding his
discharge, including that Chesnut's age-based comments were not made in
the direct context of Reeves' termination; there was no allegation that the
other individuals who recommended his firing were motivated by age; two
of those officials were over 50; all three supervisors were accused of
inaccurate recordkeeping; and several of respondent's managers were over
50 when Reeves was fired.
The Supreme Court then held that a "(1) prima facie case and
sufficient evidence of pretext may permit trier of fact to find unlawful
discrimination, without additional, independent evidence of discrimination,
though such showing will not always be adequate to sustain jury's finding
of liability... (2) in entertaining motion for judgment as matter of law,
court should review all evidence in the record.., and (3) there was
sufficient evidence for jury to find that employer had intentionally
discriminated, thus supporting verdict for employee under ADEA."
Court holds that the record demonstrates that a former employee's
grievance alleged only harassmentbased on sexual orientation,and sexual
orientationis not proscribedby Title VII and the former employee failed to
show that he reasonably believed he had made adequate complaints about
sexual harassment. Hamner v. St. Vincent Hospital and Health Care
Center, Inc., No. 99-3086, 2000 WL 1202287, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
21421 (7th Cir. Aug. 24, 2000).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a male
nursing employee could not allege termination in retaliation for submitting
a sexual harassment grievance. Title VII does not cover Gary Hamner, who
sued St. Vincent Hospital, his former employer, for retaliatory termination.
The Court affirmed a magistrate judge's decision regarding Title VII
where the plaintiff had argued that he was harassed because of his sexual
orientation (not because of his sex). The defendant moved that the plaintiff
had failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that he
opposed an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. The magistrate
judge concluded that Hamner failed to establish the first element of his
retaliation case because he failed to show that he opposed an unlawful
employment practice under Title VII.
The Court states that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under
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Title VII where it occurs due to the plaintiffs sex. However, the phrase in
Title VII prohibiting discrimination based on sex means that it is unlawful
to discriminate against women because they are women and against men
because they are men. In other words, Congress intended the term "sex" to
mean "biological male or biological female," and not one's sexuality or
sexual orientation. Therefore, harassment based solely upon a person's
sexual preference or orientation (and not on one's sex) is not an unlawful
employment practice under Title VII.
According to a recent decision by the National Labor Relations
Board, non-union employers must now permit employees to have a
coworker present during questioning regarding certain workplace
incidents. Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio, 331 NLRB No. 92, 164
L.R.R.M. 1233, (July 10, 2000).
In a case that may have far reaching consequences, the NLRB has
determined that even non-union employers must allow employees to allow
a coworker to be present during questioning regarding some workplace
incidents. Interestingly, many non-union employers do not know the
National Labor Relations Act even covers non-union employees.
Moreover, this new employer obligation comes directly from Section 7 of
that Act. Employer workplace investigations might now face a largelyunknown statutory violation. We have undoubtedly not seen the end of this
case, as it represents a major and sudden rule change.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorarito decide whether or not
the Federal Arbitration Act covers employment contracts. Circuit City
Stores v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), cert granted, 120 S.Ct.
2004, (2000).
Adams sued the employer in state court claiming a violation of the
California anti-discrimination statute. The employer then sued in federal
court seeking a stay of the state court action and seeking an order to compel
arbitration. The federal trial compelled arbitration; the 9th Circuit reversed;
the Supreme Court has now granted certiorari.
Adams signed a job application that included an agreement to submit
all claims and disputes to arbitration. An employee cannot work for the
employer without signing the arbitration agreement. The 9th Circuit
previously held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply to
labor or employment contracts. Even though the arbitration agreement in
this case provided that it did not form a contract of employment, the Court
of Appeals held that the arbitration agreement signed by employee at time
of job application was an "employment contract," and thus the FAA was

162

U. PA. JouRNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

inapplicable.

[Vol. 3:1

